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# DOCUMENTS

## ON THE

# KOREAN CRISIS



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OTTAWA  
EDMOND CLOUTIER, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P.  
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*To His Excellency  
The Governor General in Council*

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I have the honour to lay before Your Excellency the attached Report entitled "Documents on the Korean Crisis". This will supplement the material contained in the report entitled "Canada and the Korean Crisis" which I submitted to you on September 1, 1950.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Excellency's Obedient Servant,

L. B. PEARSON,  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

OTTAWA, January 24, 1951.





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# Documents on the Korean Crisis

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## **1. Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943**

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies\* expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

## **2. Excerpt from Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945. (Paragraph 8)**

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

## **3. Note from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, September 26, 1950: (Canadian Army Special Force).**

I have the honour to refer to my Note of August 14, 1950, transmitting a copy of the Prime Minister's statement of August 7, 1950, concerning the recruitment of the Canadian Army's Special Force which would be specially trained and equipped to be available for use in carrying out Canada's undertakings under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty. The Prime Minister also indicated that, subject to the approval of the Parliament of Canada, this Special Force would be available for service in Korea as part of the United Nations Forces, if it could be most effectively used in this way when it was ready for service.

I am instructed to inform you that this Special Force has now been recruited and is undergoing training and that its use for service with the United Nations Forces in Korea has been authorized.

---

\*United States of America, United Kingdom and China.



The Special Force consists of a brigade group, including three infantry battalions, one field regiment of artillery, one squadron of self-propelled anti-tank guns, together with engineer, signal, medical, ordnance and other services, with appropriate reinforcements.

Upon reaching a state of training satisfactory to the Canadian Government this Force will be made available for combat service with the United Nations Forces in Korea as required. Arrangements for advanced and final training of the Force and for its subsequent service in Korea will be made with the Unified Command. Informal discussions to this end have already been held with the Unified Command.

#### **4. Excerpts from a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Plenary Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 27, 1950**

...Events—and United States and British soldiers—are rapidly demonstrating in Korea that aggression does not pay. It will soon be necessary for the United Nations to show with equal vigour and resourcefulness that it can deal with the problems of the post-aggression period in Korea. The political and economic life of that country must be established on a basis which will enable the Korean people to fulfil the destiny that has been promised them. As hostilities draw to a close in Korea, and the Assembly takes up its new responsibilities there, it seems to our delegation that certain specific principles should govern its decisions and that we should embody these principles at once in an Assembly resolution.

In the first place, the general objective as we see it of the United Nations in Korea should be to fulfil now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous Assemblies—a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people themselves govern without interference from outside. This should be achieved by United Nations action and not through decisions reached by certain of its members.

Secondly, the United Nations must assist the people of Korea to establish peace and order throughout their territory as the firm foundation for democratic institutions and free self-government. It is our hope that the people of Northern Korea, having been forced into a perilous and disastrous venture by their communist rulers, will now themselves repudiate these rulers and co-operate with the United Nations in bringing to Korea the peace and unity which its people desire. This is the time for the aggressors to cease fire, to admit defeat. If they do, it may not be necessary for United Nations forces in Korean territory to advance far beyond their present positions. The United Nations must, however, leave its forces free to do whatever is practicable to make certain that the communist aggressors of North Korea are not permitted to re-establish some new base in the peninsula from which they could sally forth again upon a peaceful people.

Third, the Korean people—once peace has been restored—must be assured that no nation will exploit the present situation in Korea for its own particular advantage. This of course means a Korea without foreign bases and free of



foreign military domination; it means a Korea which will be responsible for its own defence within the framework of our collective security system. Above all, it means a Korea which will not be divided and disturbed by subversive communist elements directed from outside Korea.

The fourth principle should be that nothing shall be done in the establishment of a united, free Korea which carries any menace to Korea's neighbours. There have been comments in the press and elsewhere about the role which the Korean peninsula has played in invasions of the Asiatic mainland. Nothing must be done in Korea, as indeed nothing will be done, which holds the least suggestion that any member of the United Nations has any purpose whatever in Korea, other than to establish that country under the full sovereignty of its own people. Korea does not menace any of its neighbours, though in recent years it has had reason to fear the menace of at least one of those neighbours.

My fifth principle is that the free governments of Asia should take a major share of the responsibility for advising the Korean people upon methods of government which they should adopt and procedures which they should follow in establishing these methods of government. The countries of Asia and of the Western Pacific have made an outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations. I think we should now make sure that we gain full advantage of the judgment of these states in charting a course for the future in Korea in the difficult days ahead...

#### **5. General MacArthur's Message of October 1, 1950, to the Commander-in-Chief, North Korean Forces**

The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war-making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, call upon you and forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct—and I call upon you at once to liberate all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to such places as I indicate. North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care dictated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable. I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property.

#### **6. Excerpts from a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the First (Political) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, October 3, 1950**

... The Committee now has two draft resolutions before it, one in the name of eight delegations, about which I should like to say a few words, and one in the name of five delegations headed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The eight-power draft resolution now before the Committee is being discussed

here, along with the other draft resolutions on this subject, at a moment when the victory of the United Nations forces has brought with it a new sense of hope and confidence to all those who supported the United Nations in this test of its authority and of its effectiveness. And yet, military victory in itself does not, of course, provide a solution of the wider political problems which are so closely related to the Korean war.

We must therefore strive to ensure that this victory for the United Nations over the forces of aggression will to the fullest possible extent serve the cause of future peace and security.

Thus, the Canadian delegation considers that the draft resolution now before the Committee in the name of eight Governments does point in the right direction. It is, we think, both moderate and constructive in its approach to the problem. We found the same moderation in the proclamation issued on Saturday last to the North Korean Forces by the United Nations Commander-in-Chief. There is, I think, a determination on all our parts at this time to avoid anything which might exacerbate the situation or prolong the struggle. That is certainly in great contrast to the rashness of those who provoked the struggle and of those who, behind them, instigated it. Those who refuse now to lay down their arms and cease fighting, or those who persuade them to take that course, must bear a heavy responsibility for what happens in the days ahead.

The eight-power draft resolution deals with two aspects of the three-sided problem of Korea. The third aspect—which is that of military action—is, I think, properly the responsibility of the Unified Command and the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, acting, however, within the terms of the Security Council resolutions which have been adopted or of other United Nations resolutions which may be adopted. Strategy and politics, however, though separable at times in theory, are rarely separable in practice. It seems obvious to us that no resolutions of this Assembly should interfere with military action which is considered essential to repel, extinguish and prevent the recurrence of aggression in Korea.

But political considerations enter in when we consider the objectives to be pursued by whatever military action is taken. These objectives, as understood, I think, by the great majority of this Committee, have been already clearly stated in this Committee—particularly in the impressive statement last Saturday of the representative of the United States. Surely, therefore, there can now remain no doubt about the fact that United Nations Forces in Korea in their operations there, are and must be, restricted to the restoration of peace and security, which is the sole task allotted to them by the Security Council. No one contemplates or will contemplate, I am sure, using these Forces for any other purpose. At the same time, it seems to me that we should not prevent them, by anything we do here, from being used for that purpose . . .

## **7. Excerpt from Statement by Premier Chou En-lai of October 1, 1950**

The Chinese people "will not be afraid to fight aggression in defense of peace. They will not tolerate foreign aggression and will not stand aside should the imperialists wantonly invade the territory of their neighbor."

### **8. General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950, on "the Problem of the Independence of Korea"**

#### *The General Assembly*

*Having regard* to its resolutions of 14 November 1947, of 12 December 1948 and of 21 October 1949,

*Having* received and considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

*Mindful* of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished and in particular that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea;

*Recalling* its declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful Government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;

*Having in mind* that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

*Recalling* that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea,

#### *Recommends*

- (a) That all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea,
- (b) That all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign State of Korea,
- (c) That all sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified Government,
- (d) That United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified at (a) and (b) above,
- (e) That all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;



*Resolves that*

- (a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey and Thailand to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission in Korea; (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connexion with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;
- (b) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, Governments represented on the Commission should form an interim committee composed of representatives meeting at the Seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the above recommendations; the interim committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of this resolution by the General Assembly;
- (c) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;

*The General Assembly furthermore,*

*Mindful* of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude,

*Requests* the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within three weeks of the adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly.

*Also recommends* the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea;

*Expresses* its appreciation of the services rendered by the members of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance of their important and difficult task;

*Requests* that the Secretary-General shall provide the Commission with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and *per diem* of a representative and alternate from each of the States members of the Commission.



## **9. General MacArthur's Message of October 9, 1950, to the Commander-in-Chief, North Korean Forces**

In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, for the last time call upon you and the forces under your command in whatever part of Korea situated, to lay down your arms and cease hostilities. And I call upon all north Koreans to co-operate fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea, assured that they will be treated justly and that the United Nations will act to relieve and rehabilitate all parts of a unified Korea. Unless immediate response is made by you in the name of the north Korean government, I shall at once proceed to take such military actions as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations.

## **10. Interim Committee on Korea Resolution of October 12, 1950: "Advice and Recommendations from the Interim Committee to the Unified Command"**

1. *Considering* the provisions of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7th October, under which the Interim Committee on Korea is requested to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the recommendations contained in that resolution;

2. *Having regard* to the General Assembly recommendation that all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea;

3. *Recalling* that the Government of the Republic of Korea has been recognized by the United Nations as a lawful government having effective control over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult, and that there is consequently no government that is recognized by the United Nations as having legal and effective control over other parts of Korea;

4. *Advises* the Unified Command to assume provisionally all responsibilities for the government and civil administration of those parts of Korea which had not been recognized by the United Nations as being under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Korea at the outbreak of hostilities, and which may now come under occupation by United Nations forces, pending consideration by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea of the administration of these territories; and

5. *Recommends* that the Unified Command take immediate steps to associate with all authorities established for civilian administration in accordance with the present resolution officers from the several forces of members of the United Nations serving under the Unified Command in Korea;

6. *Invites* the Unified Command to keep the Interim Committee informed of the steps taken in response to this resolution, pending the arrival of the commission in Korea.

# **11. Excerpts from a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum, October 24, 1950**

... When the Republic of Korea was attacked by aggressors in June, there were no international forces in being which could be used against the invaders. The provisions which had been written into the Charter designed to equip the United Nations with such forces had remained inoperative because it was impossible to agree with the Soviet Union on how such forces should be raised. Nevertheless, all those countries which value their own freedom and which realize that in the last analysis it cannot be maintained unless the freedom of other countries is also preserved were at once acutely aware that this attack could not be allowed to succeed. They also realized that a broad international effort should be made to defeat it. In that situation the Government of the United States acted with great vigour and courage. On behalf of the United Nations, and in response to a resolution of the Security Council, American troops were at once committed to battle in a desperate attempt to stem the invasion. No praise would be too great for the heroism they displayed and for the prodigies they performed. All of us throughout the free world are greatly in their debt.

Gradually other countries were able to make contributions to augment the strength of United Nations forces in Korea. Naval and air contingents were despatched by seven countries, including my own, Canada, and, as the need for additional ground forces became apparent, steps were taken in a number of countries to raise them for service in Korea. This was a slow process, however; and to the present day, of course, your forces, along with those of the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom have had to bear the brunt of the fighting.

The delay in the despatch of ground forces of other countries to take their place in the line in Korea must often have been hard to understand. However, it was an inevitable result of the failure of the United Nations to make prior arrangements for the organization of international forces which could be used in such a situation. Smaller countries like my own do not ordinarily have armed forces available for quick despatch to any part of the world; and we had not been given any indication that the Security Council would be able to agree on measures by which such forces would be required. Our experience had led us to believe that action of this kind would not be possible because of the operation of the veto.

The Korean war has underlined the necessity for arrangements within the United Nations, which would enable a genuinely international force to be quickly assembled. The resolution which was recently passed by the General Assembly attempts to provide such permanent arrangements; and it seems to me to be well designed to that end. We in Canada have taken special interest in this proposal for the creation on a permanent basis of international forces earmarked to carry out obligations we have all undertaken under the United Nations Charter. When we announced in Canada the raising of our special force for service in Korea, we made it clear that this force would be available for whatever action might be necessary in any quarter of the globe in order to carry out our military obligations either under the United Nations Charter or under the North Atlantic Treaty. We were the first country, I believe, to

earmark a portion of our forces in this way. And I think I am right in saying that that declaration by the Canadian Government was the germ from which the central section of the present Assembly resolution was developed; that section in which it is recommended that each member of the United Nations should, and I quote, "maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained and organized that they could promptly be made available for service as a United Nations unit or units upon recommendation by the General Assembly or the Security Council". If member states carry out this recommendation, the United Nations will never again be in the position in which it found itself last June. . . .

## **12. Special Report of November 5, 1950, from Commanding General United Nations Command (Communist Chinese Intervention)**

"I herewith submit a special report of the United Nations Command operations in Korea which I believe should be brought to the attention of the United Nations.

### **"Introduction:**

"The United Nations Forces in Korea are continuing their drive to the north and their efforts to destroy further the effectiveness of the enemy as a fighting force are proving successful. However, presently in certain areas of Korea, the United Nations Forces are meeting a new foe. It is apparent to our fighting forces, and our intelligence agencies have confirmed the fact, that the United Nations are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units deployed for action against the forces of the United Command.

### **"The fact of intervention:**

"Hereafter, in summary form, are confirmed intelligence reports substantiating the fact that forces other than Korean are resisting our efforts to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations:

"A. 22 August: Approximately 50 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 7000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of the Sui-Ho reservoir; damage, none; time 1600 K; weather, 10 miles visibility, high broken clouds.

"B. 24 August: Approximately 40 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 10000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none, time 1500K; weather, 20 miles visibility.

"C. 15 October: Anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of Yalu River against a flight of 4 F-51's flying near the Sinuiju airfield on the Korean side of the river; damage, 1 aircraft total loss; time, 1445 I; weather, overcast at 8000 feet; 8 to 10 miles visibility.

"D. 16 October: The 370th Regiment of the 124th Division of the Chinese Communist 42nd Army, consisting of approximately 2,500 troops, crossed the Yalu River (Korean border) at Wan Po Jin, and proceeded to the area of Chosen and Fusen Dams in North Korea where they came in contact with UN forces approximately 40 miles north of Hamhung.



"E. 17 October: Approximately 15 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 10000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none; time 1200 I; weather, 8 miles visibility, low clouds 2300 feet.

"F. 20 October: A Chinese Communist Task Force known as the '56th' unit consisting of approximately 5,000 troops crossed the Yalu River (Korean border) at Antung and deployed to positions in Korea south of the Sui-Ho Dam. A captured Chinese Communist soldier of this Task Force states that his group was organized out of the regular Chinese Communist 40th Army stationed at Antung, Manchuria.

"G. 1 November: A flight of F-51's was attacked early in the afternoon by 6 to 9 Jet aircraft which flew across the Yalu River into Manchuria. No damage was done to US aircraft. A red star was observed on the top of the right wing on one of the Jet aircraft.

"H. 1 November: Anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the Yalu River directed against a flight of 13 F-80 aircraft was observed in the vicinity of Sinuiju at 1345 hours. This resulted in the total loss of 1 UN aircraft.

"I. 30 October: Interrogation of 19 Chinese prisoners of war identified two additional regiments of 124 CCF Division, the 371 and the 372 in the vicinity of Changjin.

"J. 2 November: Interrogation of prisoners of war indicates the 54 CCF unit in Korea. This unit is reported to have same organization as 55 and 56 units, but to be drawn from the 112, 113 and 114 Divisions of the 38 CCF Army.

"K. 3 November: Further interrogation of Chinese prisoners of war indicates 56 CCF unit organized from elements of 118, 119 and 120 CCF Divisions of the 40 CCF Army.

"L. 4 November: As of this date, a total of 35 CCF prisoners had been taken in Korea.

"The continued employment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the hostile attitude assumed by such forces, either inside or outside Korea, are matters which it is incumbent upon me to bring at once to the attention of the UN."

### **13. Security Council Resolution of November 8, 1950, inviting Communist China to attend discussion of the Special Report**

*The Security Council,*

*Decides* to invite, in accordance with rule 39 of the rules of procedure, a representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to be present during discussion by the Council of the Special Report of the United Nations Command in Korea.



**14. Draft Six Power Security Council Resolution of November 10, 1950  
(vetoed by U.S.S.R. on November 30); "Complaint of Aggression  
upon the Republic of Korea"**

*Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States  
of America.*

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolution of 25 June 1950, determining that the North Korean forces had committed a breach of the peace and calling upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities,

*Recalling* the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950, which sets forth the policies of the United Nations in respect to Korea,

*Having noted* from the special report of the United Nations Command in Korea dated 5 November 1950 that Chinese Communist military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United Nations in Korea,

*Affirming* that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a unified independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea, as set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly dated 7 October 1950,

*Insistent* that no action be taken which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security,

*Calls upon* all States and authorities, and in particular those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea;

*Affirms* that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;

*Calls attention* to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a policy;

*Requests* the Interim Committee on Korea and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and suggests that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon as possible, and, pending its arrival that it utilize the assistance of such States members of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this purpose.

# **15. Excerpts from a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Windsor, Ontario, November 15, 1950**

... we will have to watch with particular care those areas and countries which lie on a periphery of the free world and are most open to Soviet attack. The marches of the free world are obviously the most critical points. It is there that the two worlds rub together. Even when aggression is not threatened, there is bound to be a certain amount of friction and unease along these borders. I do not need to insist, I imagine, on our determination to help in defending these areas from unprovoked aggression. By now, that should be beyond question. At the same time, we must hope that those primarily responsible for safeguarding the security of such areas of the world should carry out their mission in as steady and unprovocative a way as possible. We should go about without chips on our shoulders or fire in our eyes! It is difficult to decide how far the fears which the Soviet Union and its satellites profess for the West are genuine and how far they are trumped up to cloak their own totalitarian designs. Mostly the latter, I suspect. But the information which reaches the Kremlin about the West comes, in so many cases, from sources tainted by the prejudices of Marxist orthodoxy that we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that some genuine fear does play a considerable part in the formulation of the policy of the Soviet Union and its satellites. This possibility should be especially borne in mind, I think, on any occasion when it is necessary to conduct defensive military operations close to the borders of Communist states. Here we should do what we can to reduce those fears to a minimum and to reassure bordering states that their legitimate interests will not be infringed. I have in mind, of course, particularly tonight the situation in North Korea, where United Nations Forces are operating very close to the borders of Manchuria and Siberia. The integrity of their frontiers are, of course, of concern to those two governments. They are also concerned about the safety of valuable installations lying along the border. Nothing therefore should be left undone which could help to convince them that those legitimate concerns will be respected; even though in reverse circumstances we of the free world would not be shown such consideration. The motives which have prompted the Chinese Communist Government in Peking to despatch forces into North Korea are still obscure. Until we are obliged to believe otherwise, however, I would suggest that it might be wise to assume, as indeed is suggested by some of the evidence, that this incursion has been dictated by limited considerations and that it should not deflect us from our policy of trying, in every way open to us, to prevent the war from spreading.

Speaking in the House of Commons on August 31 I said: "I would like to emphasize also that it is not the purpose of this Government to support any course of policy which will extend the scope of the present conflict in Korea; a conflict which should be confined and localized if it is in our power to do that; and, if not, a policy which should avoid giving anyone else an excuse for extending it". That has been the policy of the Canadian Government from the outset of the war in Korea. It is still our policy today. And we have used whatever influence we have to urge these views on other governments which are involved in the hostilities in Korea. We have also urged—I did so when I spoke before the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 27th of September—that

nothing should be done in the establishment of a united and free Korea which would carry the slightest menace to Korea's neighbours. Strict observance of these principles may, I am aware, in certain circumstances, complicate the immediate problems which face the United Nations Commander in Korea. Nevertheless I am convinced that we must be guided by them constantly as long as there is any chance of preventing the war from spreading. It may be that the Chinese Communists will demonstrate by their future actions that what they intend is an unlimited aggression against Korea. If unhappily that turns out to be the case, it will be necessary for the United Nations to take knowledge of the fact and to enlarge the field of action of the United Nations Commander. The aggressor may have to be met where he comes from. The Canadian Government could hardly, however, be party to any action which has not been sanctioned by the United Nations or support within the United Nations any action to extend the field of operations unless and until it is clear that Chinese Communist forces have been sent to Korea on more than a protective and border mission.

The same desire to localize the conflict and prevent it from spreading has dictated the policy which we have followed, and will continue to follow, over Formosa. We appreciated the necessity for action which President Truman took on the 27th of June in ordering the United States Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa, because it seemed to provide a way of neutralizing that island during the course of the fighting in Korea. We also understood the explanatory comment which President Truman gave in his press conference on the 31st of August when he declared: "of course, it will not be necessary to keep the Seventh Fleet in the Formosan Straits if the Korean thing is settled. That is a flank protection on our part for the United Nations forces". The question of Formosa has now been placed by the United States on the agenda of the General Assembly. We will be prepared to support in the United Nations any appropriate resolution which would authorize the continuance of this neutralization of Formosa so long as the war in Korea makes that necessary. We are in some doubt, however, as to whether any more comprehensive action by the United Nations over Formosa could usefully be taken at this time...

#### **16. Excerpts from a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Federal-Provincial Conference in Ottawa, December 4, 1950**

The vital question at the present time, transcending immeasurably all other questions, is how great is the risk of a major war...

At the moment, the focus of our hopes and fears is Korea. We must strive to find a solution to the grave and menacing problem that has arisen there. This will be no easy task. Before it can be done, moreover, there must be a stabilization of the military front in Korea on a line which can be firmly held. Our military advice gives us reason to hope that in spite of heavy initial losses before the counter-offensive from the North, such a line can be established and maintained.



When this has been done, we can then see where we are, in regard to the political aspects of the Korean and Far Eastern questions. The Chinese Communists have now made it abundantly clear that they regard United Nations action in Korea as something that menaces their interests so greatly that they are willing to risk a general war in challenging it. Therefore, as soon as circumstances make it possible, we must take up again the effort to reconcile on the one hand the determination of the United Nations to resist aggression, and on the other whatever legitimate interests the Chinese may have in the future of Korea and the adjacent area. I am not sure that we *can* reconcile these two—our interest in world peace with the purposes behind their intervention—but we must try; and we must try by some more practical and effective means than mere public statements of good intentions and pious hopes.

During this period, when the peace of the world will be in balance, and when we shall be walking on the edge of a volcano which is rumbling alarmingly, we must not look for easy and spectacular results. We must realize that the Chinese Communist leaders, schooled in the tactics of public abuse which have long been part of the Soviet method of diplomacy, many of them completely ignorant of the Western world, are not likely to give us visible or audible help—will, in fact, make our task harder by vilifying us with scorn and slander and misrepresentation. But we need not give way to despair or to a fatalistic acceptance of something that is regarded as inevitable, and about which, therefore, nothing can be done, except to arm.

There is no reason, on the side of the free democracies, why the efforts which are now being made through the United Nations to localize and then end the war in Korea, should not succeed. We must, therefore, make it crystal clear—by our words and, more important, by our policies—that if they do not succeed, the responsibility will lie where it belongs; in Peking and in Moscow.

If as we trust, these efforts *do* succeed, the immediate danger of a Third World War would, for the moment, be removed. That would not, however, mean that we could rule out of calculation the possibility of such a war breaking out later. The materials for a fire would still be there; and there would still be madmen about with matches . . .

. . . If, . . . the leaders of international communism have convinced themselves that war with the West must come at some time, they may consider that their best opportunity will be in the months ahead. Because of this—and because of recent events in North Korea—the danger of a major war in the immediate future has, I think, increased . . .

The question whether the risk of a major war will diminish after, say, the end of 1951, depends of course, in large part on whether the Western world has been able to increase its defences and ensure the necessary unity of action; whether we can strengthen—as we are trying to do—the United Nations as an agency for preserving peace, for settling disputes and in the last analysis for organizing collective force against an aggressor. The free democracies are now taking steps to these ends at Lake Success and within the North Atlantic Organization. The crisis of the last few weeks in Korea has shown, with even greater clarity than before, the necessity for doing this and for doing it quickly and effectively.



The democratic world is—tragically but inescapably—compelled to devote an increasing proportion of its resources to the task of rearmament. This rearmament is essential and must be given priority for the time being over other objectives, but by itself, it will not be enough. We must also preserve and increase our economic and social strength. We must also take the steps necessary to rally to our side the peoples of Asia. We must give political and moral leadership of a kind which will attract and hold the support of the wavering powers, especially in Asia. Otherwise the Soviet Union may be able to extend by non-military means, by the pull of its sham but alluring offers of bread with freedom, its domination over large parts of the under-privileged, under-developed world with its masses of millions.

The forces of communist aggression in Asia have in the past successfully allied themselves with the forces of national liberation and social reform. The task of the Western democratic powers is to assist the democratic governments in those areas to break that unnatural alliance. For this purpose, it is essential that the Western countries help the Asian democratic countries in their plans for economic development, in order to relieve the distress and poverty there, on which international communism feeds. Within the measure of its resources Canada should, I think, do its part to help in this great effort to promote human welfare and hence to ensure peace . . .

In the confused and dangerous international situation of today, it is essential to try to see the world steadily, realistically, and as a whole. The obvious Soviet game is to provoke incidents and tensions at various points on the borderlands between the Western world and the Soviet Union and to try to lead us into the trap of concentrating too great a proportion of our limited resources on one or two isolated border points. It is clear that the communists are trying to lead us into this trap in Korea. In order to fight the present war in Korea a large part of the immediately available forces of the West have been committed to that country. If the war in Korea should become a war against China—and I repeat we must do everything within the power of statesmanship to prevent this—it will be difficult to avoid committing an even larger part of Western resources to that war. This would mean that we would be leaving exposed our most important and, in the long run, our most dangerous front, which remains Western Europe. That is still the part of the world where we must concentrate our main effort, on building up substantial defensive strength under the collective control of the members of the North Atlantic Pact, who are slowly but surely building the structure of a North Atlantic community—on political, economic, military and social foundations.

At present, the increasing power of that community is the greatest deterrent to war. Canada must, in its own interests, and for its own security, but in a way consistent with our position, our size and our special problems as a young and developing country, make an appropriate contribution to that collective strength.

By standing firm and strong against aggression in Western Europe, and by assisting in the struggle of the Asian people to a better life, the free Western democracies can best ensure the kind of peaceful and co-operating world which is the sole objective of their foreign policies.

# **17. Excerpts from a broadcast by the Secretary of State for External Affairs over the Trans-Canada Network, December 5, 1950**

. . . Ever since the attack on the Republic of Korea, we have believed that the efforts of those who supported United Nations action, should be directed solely towards defeating the aggression and thereby halting the chain reaction which might have followed its success. The men who decide the policies of the Soviet Union and of their communist satellites could gamble with the future of the world in order to extend the boundaries of the system under their control. We were not prepared to gamble in that reckless way. Conscious of our share of responsibility for the preservation of peace and freedom, and indeed for the preservation of human kind from the mass destruction which modern weapons make possible, we believed, and continue to believe, that we should not try to do more, in defeating this aggression, than restore the freedom and unity of Korea. The brave and strong leader in this United Nations effort is the United States. I am sure that our neighbour, in spite of provocation and notwithstanding Chinese Communist charges to the contrary, has had no thought of using the Korean situation to strengthen or expand its position in Asia or to menace any other state. If that had been its policy, United Nations action in Korea would not have received the support of 53 of its member states, including Canada . . .

It is now clear that in a further reckless act the Chinese Communists have intervened in Korea in very large numbers. Their final purpose is not yet beyond doubt, but certainly they have committed themselves to an incursion far in excess of any that might be explained by nervousness over local Chinese interests along the border between Manchuria and Korea. In this dangerous situation, it remains our view that if and when the military position is stabilized, we should try to begin negotiations with the Chinese Communists by every means possible. I am aware of the difficulties, I assure you, but I believe that nothing should be left undone which might conceivably result in an honourable and peaceful settlement in Korea. If, for example, providing the military situation is stabilized, there could be a cease-fire followed by negotiations—possibly covering more subjects than Korea—in which the Chinese Communists would participate, there might still be hope of reaching such a settlement. At least, we would have done our best and the responsibility for failure could be placed where it would belong.

I know that the policy I suggest will be called "appeasement" by some. "Warmonger", "fascist", "appeaser", "red", "peace", "democracy", such words are now used so loosely and irresponsibly that their coinage has become debased. So let us not be frightened by words. The action which was taken at Munich in 1938 and which has made "appeasement" a by-word, was open to two charges: that it was short-sighted because it was based on illusions about the nature of the government which was the aggressor at that time, and that it was shameful because it sacrificed the freedom of one country in the interests of the security of others. Neither of those accusations can be brought against the policy I have outlined. It is not appeasement. It is an attempt through diplomacy to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Asian Communist world. The United Nations Commander in Korea himself has remitted to diplomacy the task of deciding what to do in Korea in this new situation created by Chinese

intervention. It is the function of diplomacy to seek accommodation which can be the basis for stable relations between differing countries and systems. We have agreed in the past that some such accommodation with the Soviet Union and its satellites is necessary. In the present circumstances, I believe it is our duty to make every effort to reach such a settlement.

But we must not allow this process—or the situation which makes it necessary—to weaken our resolve or interfere with our plan to strengthen our defences. Above all, we must not allow it to weaken the unity, or the friendly co-operation of those countries in the free world who are now working together so closely for the good purpose of establishing conditions of stability and peace in the world.

Our task will be complicated by the necessity of keeping in mind both political and military considerations. Both, for instance, must be present in any consideration of the possible use of the atomic bomb. From the strictly legal point of view, the atomic bomb is merely another weapon, and can be used like any other weapon. The supreme crime is not the use of a particular weapon, but committing an aggression which makes the use of any weapon necessary.

The political instinct of people throughout the world, however, has insisted—and I think rightly—that the atomic bomb is different from other weapons. Not only is its destructive power far greater than that of any other weapon, but it was created as a result of the deepest penetration that man has yet made into the fundamental secrets of Nature, and if used widely enough, might destroy all life on this planet. Whether or not to use a weapon of that kind should surely not be decided by the application of the same criteria applicable to other weapons, or by unilateral decision, no matter what the technical and legal position may be. At a time of military reverses, when soldiers are trapped and encircled and are dying desperately, there will naturally be a strong temptation to sanction the use of the atomic bomb. Anyone considering such authorization, however, must remember that the fate of the whole world may depend on the decision. The atomic bomb is universally regarded as the ultimate weapon. It should be treated as such.

This is a time of desperately hard decisions. It is also a time which will demand greater sacrifices than we in Canada have ever before been asked to make; and without much of the stimulation and excitement and feeling of survival or extinction that accompanies a shooting war.

It may be that in the days ahead the process of negotiation which I have suggested will become impossible or will be tried and fail. Then those who use force will have to be met by all the force we can muster in the free world. Until that time, however, we must guard freedom by wisdom, as well as by arms.

### **18. Excerpts from Communiqué of December 9, 1950, on the Discussions between President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee**

The situation in Korea is one of great gravity and far-reaching consequences. By the end of October the forces of the United Nations had all but completed the mission set for them by the United Nations "to repel the armed attack and



to restore international peace and security in the area". A free and unified Korea—the objective which the United Nations has long sought—was well on the way to being realized. At that point Chinese Communist forces entered Korea in large numbers, and on November 27 launched a large-scale attack on the United Nations troops. The United Nations forces have the advantage of superior air power and naval support, but on the ground they are confronted by a heavy numerical superiority.

The United Nations forces were sent into Korea on the authority and at the recommendation of the United Nations. The United Nations has not changed the mission which it has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries will continue to discharge their responsibilities.

We were in complete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Lasting peace and the future of the United Nations as an instrument for world peace depend upon strong support for resistance against aggression.

For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation. The same principles of international conduct should be applied to this situation as are applied, in accordance with our obligations under the charter of the United Nations, to any threat to world peace. Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. We are confident that the great majority of the United Nations takes the same view. If the Chinese on their side display any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peoples of the world, acting through the United Nations, to decide how the principles of the charter can best be maintained. For our part, we declare in advance our firm resolve to uphold them.

We considered two questions regarding China which are already before the United Nations. On the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the two governments differ. The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People's Government and considers that its representatives should occupy China's seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the seating of the Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations. We have discussed our difference of view on this point and are determined to prevent it from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives.

On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations.

We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends.

The free nations of Asia have given strong support to the United Nations and have worked for world peace. Communist aggression in Korea increases the danger to the security and independence of these nations. We reaffirm our intention to continue to help them.

The pressure of Communist expansion existed in Europe and elsewhere long before the aggression against Korea, and measures were taken to meet it. The need to strengthen the forces of collective security had already been recognized and action for this purpose is under way. Clearly, decisions regarding the Far East have their repercussions and effects elsewhere. In considering the necessities of the Far Eastern situation, we have kept in mind the urgency of building up the strength of the whole free world.

**19. General Assembly Resolutions regarding "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea"**

**(a) General Assembly Resolution of December 14, establishing Cease-Fire Group.**

*The General Assembly,*

*Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,*

*Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself, and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,*

*Requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible.*

**(b) Draft Twelve Power General Assembly Resolution of December 11.**

*Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.*

*The General Assembly,*

*Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,*

*Considering that the continuance of this situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of world peace and security,*

*Recommends that the representatives of the following Governments, namely, ..... , shall as soon as possible meet and make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.*

**20. "Report of Group on Cease-Fire in Korea" of January 2, 1951**

On 14 December 1950 the General Assembly adopted the following resolution which had been sponsored by thirteen Asian Powers:

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,*

*"Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself, and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,*

*"Requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible."*

2. In pursuance of the resolution, the President forthwith constituted a group consisting of Mr. L. B. Pearson of Canada, Sir Benegal N. Rau of India and himself, and announced this fact to the General Assembly. The Group met almost immediately afterwards and decided to associate the Secretary-General of the United Nations with its work.

3. A copy of the resolution was sent on 15 December to Ambassador Wu, the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China who was then in New York.

4. On 15 December, as a first step in carrying out its task the Group consulted the representatives of the Unified Command as to what they considered to be a satisfactory basis for a cease-fire. The suggestions which emerged from this consultation and which in the circumstances the Group felt constituted a reasonable basis for discussion, are summarized below:

- (1) All governments and authorities concerned, including the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities, shall order and enforce a cessation of all acts of armed force in Korea. This cease-fire shall apply to all of Korea.
- (2) There shall be established a demilitarised area across Korea of approximately twenty miles in depth with the southern limit following generally the line of the 38th parallel.
- (3) All ground forces shall remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear; forces, including guerillas, within or in advance of the demilitarised area must be moved to the rear of the demilitarised area; opposing air forces shall respect the demilitarised zone and the areas beyond the zone; opposing Naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the land areas occupied by the opposing armed forces to the limit of 3 miles from shore.
- (4) Supervision of the cease-fire shall be by a United Nations Commission whose members and designated observers shall insure full compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. They shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea. All governments and authorities shall co-operate with the Cease-Fire Commission and its designated observers in the performance of their duties.
- (5) All governments and authorities shall cease promptly the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement units or personnel, including volunteers, and the introduction of additional war equipment and material. Such equipment and material will not include supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Cease-Fire Commission.
- (6) Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis, pending final settlement of the Korean question.



- (7) Appropriate provision shall be made in the cease-fire arrangements in regard to steps to insure (a) the security of the forces; (b) the movement of refugees; and (c) the handling of other specific problems arising out of the cease-fire, including civil government and police power in the demilitarised zone.
- (8) The General Assembly should be asked to confirm the cease-fire arrangements, which should continue in effect until superseded by further steps approved by the United Nations.

5. The Group then attempted to consult the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and, for this purpose, sent a message by hand to Ambassador Wu and repeated it by cable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Peking. The text of this message is reproduced below:

"Dear Ambassador Wu,

"As you have already been informed by Resolution 1717, a copy of which was sent to you yesterday, a Committee was set up by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the previous day, December 14, consisting of myself and my two colleagues, Sir Benegal Rau of India, and Mr. L. B. Pearson of Canada, charged with the duty of determining whether it is possible to arrange appropriate and satisfactory conditions for a cease-fire in Korea. The purpose of this cease-fire in Korea will be to prevent the conflict from spreading to other area, to put an end to the fighting in Korea, and to provide an opportunity for considering what further steps should be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

"The above Committee has now met representatives of the Unified Command in Korea, and has discussed with them, in an exploratory manner, possible conditions upon which a cease-fire might be established. Since the Government of the Communist People's Republic of China has expressed strong views on the future of Korea, and about the present state of warfare in that country, and since Chinese are participating in that warfare, the Committee wishes also to discuss with your Government or its representatives, and with the military authorities in command of the forces operating in North Korea possible conditions upon which a cease-fire might be established. For this purpose, we desire to see you at your earliest convenience, and we should be grateful to know when a meeting can be arranged.

"We realised that your Government which sent you here with other objects in mind, may prefer other arrangements by which a cease-fire can be discussed with them. We wish your Government to know that, in the interests of stopping the fighting in Korea and of facilitating a just settlement of the issues there in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, we are prepared to discuss cease-fire arrangements with your Government or its representatives either here or elsewhere, as would be mutually convenient. We urge only that arrangements for these discus-

sions should be made with the least possible delay. With this in mind, we are sending the text of this communication directly to your Government by telegram.

Yours sincerely,

NASROLLAH ENTEZAM."

December 16, 1950.

6. On 18 December, Mr. Pearson, on behalf of the Group, submitted a brief preliminary account of its activities to the First Committee, hoping that a fuller report would be made in the near future.

7. On 16 December, the President, acting on behalf of the Group, had availed himself of the good offices of the Swedish Delegation to transmit through the Swedish Embassy in Peking a request to the Central People's Government that Ambassador Wu be instructed to stay on in New York and discuss with the Group the possibility of arranging a cease-fire. The reply to the request, communicated to the President on 21 December, through the same channel was as follows:

"The Central People's Government acknowledges receipt of a message dated 18th December 1950 from Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly transmitted via the Swedish Government and ask the Swedish Government to transmit the following reply to Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly.

"The representative of the People's Republic of China neither participated in nor agreed to the adoption of the Resolution concerning the so-called 3-men Committee for Cease Fire in Korea by United Nations General Assembly. The Central People's Government has repeatedly declared that the Central People's Government would regard as illegal and null and void all major resolutions especially those concerning Asia which might be adopted by the United Nations without the participation and approval of the duly appointed delegates of the People's Republic of China. Therefore the Central People's Government cannot instruct its representative General Wu to continue to remain in Lake Success for negotiations with the above-mentioned 3-men illegal Committee. After the Security Council unreasonably voted against the "Complaint against the United States armed aggression against Taiwan" raised by the People's Republic of China General Wu was instructed by the Central People's Government to continue to stay at Lake Success for participation in the discussion of "the complaint of the U.S. aggression against China" submitted by the U.S.S.R. representative; although he has waited for a long time and until the United Nations General Assembly was declared adjourned, he was still not given the opportunity to speak. Under such circumstances, the Central People's Government deems that there is no more necessity for General Wu and his staff to remain at Lake Success and has therefore instructed him to start their homeward journey on December 19.

"2. As to the question of how the United Nations may get in touch with the Korean Democratic People's Republic the Central People's Government is of the opinion that United Nations should address direct inquiry to the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic."

8. On 19 December, acting on a recommendation from the sponsors of the twelve-Power resolution introduced in the First Committee on 12 December, the Group sent another message to the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government. This was intended to remove any possible misunderstandings which may have arisen out of the separation of the twelve-Power resolution from the thirteen-Power resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December.

The text of the message is given below:

"CHOU EN-LAI,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
(PEKING, CHINA).

In the consideration which you are giving to our earlier message, we are anxious that there should be no misunderstanding as to the relationship between the United Nations Resolution establishing a cease fire group, and resolution proposed by twelve Asian Governments, recommending appointment of a committee to meet as soon as possible and make recommendations for peaceful settlement of existing issues in Far East. It is our clear understanding and also that of the twelve Asian sponsors, that once a cease fire arrangement had been achieved, the negotiations visualised in the second resolution should be proceeded with at once. Indeed, the preamble to cease fire resolution states specifically that steps should be taken for a peaceful settlement when fighting in Korea is ended. It is also our view, as well as that of the twelve Asian governments sponsoring the second resolution, that Government of the Peoples Republic of China should be included in the Negotiating Committee referred to in that resolution. We feel that this Committee could become an effective channel for seeking peaceful solution of existing issues in Far East between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. For that purpose, in our opinion, it should be set up with minimum of delay, but to make that possible a "cease fire" arrangement must be put into effect. This point of view has been communicated to your Delegation which left New York today, and we express the hope that you will give full weight to it.

Committee of the General Assembly  
NASROLLAH ENTEZAM, President of the General Assembly  
SIR BENEGAL RAU  
LESTER B. PEARSON"

9. On 23 December, the President of the General Assembly, in his capacity as such, received from the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government the text of a statement issued by the latter in Peking on 22 December explaining



the attitude of the Central People's Government on the Resolution constituting the Cease-Fire Group and on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This document is reproduced as an Annex. It appears to be in the nature of an answer to the Group's message of 16 December.

10. In these circumstances and in spite of its best efforts, the Group regrets that it has been unable to pursue discussion of a satisfactory cease-fire arrangement. It therefore feels that no recommendation in regard to a cease-fire can usefully be made by it at this time.

## ANNEX I

### TO THE REPORT OF THE GROUP ON CEASE FIRE IN KOREA

*(Cablegram dated 23 December 1950 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China addressed to the President of the General Assembly)*

PEKING, December 23, 1950

Mr. NASROLLAH ENTEZAM,

President of the Fifth Session

of the United Nations General Assembly,

Lake Success.

The attitude of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China and that of the U.S.S.R. have repeatedly proposed that all foreign troops the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is to be found in my statement issued on December 22. Besides being broadcast by the Hsiu Hua News Agency on the same date, the said statement is hereby transmitted by cable for your information.

CHOU EN-LAI,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the  
Central Peoples Government of the  
Peoples Republic of China,*

PEKING, December 22, 1950.

STATEMENT BY CHOU EN-LAI, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE  
CENTRAL PEOPLES GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
ON THE RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE "THREE-MAN COMMITTEE FOR  
CEASE-FIRE IN KOREA" ILLEGALLY ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ON DECEMBER 14, 1950.

The General Assembly of the United Nations illegally adopted a resolution submitted by thirteen nations concerning a so-called cease-fire in Korea. This resolution provided for the establishment of a three-man committee, consisting of the President of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly,

Entezam, the Indian Delegate Rau, and the Canadian Delegate Pearson both appointed by him, to conduct talks to determine whether it is possible to arrange appropriate and satisfactory conditions for a cease-fire in Korea, and then to make recommendations to the United Nations General Assembly. With reference to this resolution, Chou En-Lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central Peoples Government, the Peoples Republic of China, issues the following statement:

"1" The Representative of the Peoples Republic of China neither participated in nor agreed to the adoption of the resolution concerning the so-called "three-man committee for cease-fire in Korea" by the United Nations General Assembly. Prior to this, the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China had repeatedly declared that the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China would regard as illegal and null and void all resolutions on major problems, especially those concerning the major problems of Asia, which might be adopted by the United Nations without the participation and concurrence of the duly appointed Delegates of the Peoples Republic of China. Therefore, the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and its Delegates are not prepared to make any contact with the above mentioned illegal "three-man committee".

"2" The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China has always held and still holds that the hostilities in Korea should be speedily brought to an end. In order to end the hostilities in Korea, genuine peace must be restored in Korea, and the Korean people must have genuine freedom to settle their own problems. The reason why the hostilities in Korea have not yet been put to an end is precisely because of the fact that the United States Government has despatched troops to invade Korea and is continuing and extending its policies of aggression and war. As far back as the beginning of the hostilities in Korea, we here stood for the peaceful settlement and localisation of the Korean problem. For this reason, the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and that of the U.S.S.R. have repeatedly proposed that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea, and that the Korean people be left alone to settle the Korean problem themselves. However, the United States Government not only rejected such a proposal, but also rejected negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. When the invading troops of the United States arrogantly crossed the 38th parallel, at the beginning of the month of October, the United States Government, recklessly ignoring warnings from all quarters and following the provocative crossing of the border by Syngman Rhee in June, thoroughly destroyed, and hence obliterated forever this demarcation line of political geography. In the later part of November, when the Representative of the Peoples Republic of China was invited to take part in the discussion by the Security Council on the charge against United States aggression in Taiwan, he again submitted the proposal that the United States and other foreign troops be all withdrawn from Korea, and that the People of South and North Korea be left alone to settle their domestic affairs. But the United Nations Security Council, under the domination of the United States, rejected this reasonable peace proposal from the Government of the Peoples Republic of China. From this it is evident that since the United States Government has

from the very beginning refused to withdraw its troops, it has absolutely no sincerity in ending the hostilities in Korea, still less in letting the Korean people have genuine peace and freedom.

"3" This being the case, why does the American delegate, Mr. Austin, now favour an immediate cease-fire in Korea, and why does President Truman also express willingness to conduct negotiations to settle the hostilities in Korea? It is not difficult to understand that, when the American invading troops were landing at Inchon, crossing the 38th parallel or pressing toward the Yalu River, they did not favour an immediate cease-fire and were not willing to conduct negotiations. It is only today when the American invading troops have sustained defeat, that they favour an immediate cease-fire and the conducting of negotiations after the cease-fire. Very obviously, they opposed peace yesterday, so that the United States might continue to extend her aggression; and they favour a cease-fire today, so that the United States may gain a breathing space and prepare to attack again, or at least hold their present aggressive position in preparation for further advance. What they care about is not the interests of the Korean people and the Asian peoples, nor those of the American people. They are only interested in how American imperialists can maintain their invading troops and aggressive activities in Korea, how they can continue to invade and occupy China's Taiwan and how they can intensify the preparation for war in the capitalist world. Therefore, the Representative of MacArthur's Headquarters said bluntly that they could accept a cease-fire only on a military basis and without any political conditions. This means that, all the status of aggression will remain the same after the cease-fire, so that they can fight again when they are prepared. Further, they could take this opportunity to declare the existence of a state of emergency and to prepare for mobilization in the United States, in Western Europe and Japan, thus driving the peoples of the United States, Western Europe and Japan down into the abyss of war. Is this not what Messrs. Truman, Acheson, Marshall and MacArthur are doing now? With reference to the so-called proposal for cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards, irrespective of the fact that the proposal by the twelve nations had neither been adopted by the Security Council nor by the United Nations General Assembly and irrespective of what countries are to be included in the negotiating conference and even if all these had been agreed upon, the agenda and contents of the negotiation could still be discussed endlessly after the cease-fire. If the conference is not a conference of the legal Security Council or of the legal Five Power conferences, or is not affiliated to them, the U.S. Government in the last resort can still manipulate its voting machine. Thus to discuss the cease-fire and start negotiations not on the basis of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settling of Korean domestic affairs by the Korean people themselves is to act hypocritically and would therefore suit the designs of the U.S. Government, and hence cannot satisfy the sincere desire of the peace-loving peoples of the world. The three-man committee—a cease-fire on the spot—peace negotiations—launching of a huge offensive: this Marshall formula is not in the least unfamiliar to the Chinese people, because in 1946, General Marshall assisted Chiang Kai Shek in this way, repeatedly for a whole year, and in the end had to



admit failure and leave. Will the people of China, who had learned this lesson in 1946 and later gained victory, fall into such trap today? No, the old trick of General Marshall will not work again in the United Nations.

"4" Moreover, the present issues are definitely not confined to the Korean problem. While the United States Government was engineering the hostilities in Korea, it despatched the Seventh Fleet to invade China's Taiwan and then bombed North-East China, fired on Chinese merchant vessels and extended its aggression in East Asia. Against all this, the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China has repeatedly lodged charges with the United Nations. But under American domination, the majority in the United Nations has not only upheld American aggression against Korea and supported American invasion and occupation of Taiwan, and the bombing of North-East China, but also rejected the three proposals submitted by our representative on the charge against the United States for armed aggression against Taiwan, and shelved the charge of United States aggression against China made by the Delegate of the Soviet Union. Our Representative was kept waiting for a long time and until the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly was indefinitely adjourned, he was not given a chance to speak.

This attitude which was taken by the majority of the United Nations under the domination of the Anglo-American bloc, obviously violates the United Nations Charter and its purposes. They are furthering rather than checking American aggression. They are undermining rather than defending world peace.

What particularly arouses the world's indignation is that, in spite of the fact that during the past several months the United Nations held innumerable discussions on China or on important questions concerning China, the Delegates of the Peoples Republic of China, who are the only Representatives of the four hundred and seventy-four million people of China, are still being kept out of the doors of the United Nations, whereas the Representatives of a handful of the Chiang Kai Shek reactionary remnants are still being allowed to usurp the seats of the Chinese Delegation in the United Nations. To such an extent the Chinese people have been slighted and insulted!

Therefore, the Chinese people, who, impelled by righteous indignation, have risen to volunteer in resisting the United States and helping Korea, and thus protecting their homes and defending their country, are absolutely reasonable and justified in so doing. The Chinese peoples' volunteers, who have been forced to take up arms side by side with the Korean Peoples' Army to resist the American aggressors, under the Unified Command of the Government of the Korean Democratic Peoples Republic, are fighting for their own existence, fighting to aid Korea and fighting for the peace of East Asia as well as the peace of the whole world.

"5" It must be pointed out that the proposal for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem submitted by the majority of the Delegates of the thirteen Asian and Arabian nations was originally based on their desire for peace, and this is understandable. But they have failed to see through the whole intrigue of the United States Government in supporting the proposal for a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards, and therefore they have not seriously considered

the basic proposals of the Chinese Government concerning the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

The original thirteen-nation resolution was not wholly palatable to the United States Government, so it was separated into two resolutions. The first resolution, or the resolution providing for the so-called "three man committee for cease-fire in Korea", which is satisfactory to the United States, was, under pressure, given priority for discussion and was consequently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. But the second resolution, or the resolution providing for a so-called "negotiating conference" "negotiating commission", with which the United States was either not satisfied, or not quite satisfied, was therefore shelved for the time being.

The difference between these two resolutions was remarkably demonstrated by the attitude of the Philippine Delegate. The Philippine Delegate, who always follows in the footsteps of the United States, only agreed to the first resolution but withdrew from the second resolution. This trick of close co-operation displayed by the Philippines in the role of demanding a cease-fire and by the United States in the role supporting it has thus been exposed.

From this fact itself, the lesson can be drawn that if the Asian and Arabian nations wish to gain genuine peace, they must free themselves from United States pressure and must abandon the "three man committee for cease-fire in Korea", and give up the idea of cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards.

"6" The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China solemnly declares that the Chinese people eagerly hope that the hostilities in Korea can be settled peacefully. We firmly insist that, as a basis for negotiating for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, and Korea's domestic affairs must be settled by the Korean people themselves. The American aggression forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan. And the Representatives of the Peoples Republic of China must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations. These points are not only the justified demands of the Chinese people and the Korean people; they are also the urgent desire of all progressive public opinion throughout the world. To put aside these points would make it impossible to settle peacefully the Korean problem and the important problems of Asia.

## **21. "Supplementary Report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea" (Statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs on January 11, 1951, to the First Committee of the General Assembly)**

It will be remembered by the committee that the representative of Norway several days ago asked the cease-fire group if, in its consideration of the problem before it, it had examined the possibility of a statement of principles which might underlie not only a cease-fire but a settlement of Far Eastern problems, and at that time, speaking for the committee, I said that we had made such an examination, but we would pursue it further in the hope that we could submit to the committee a statement which will embody such principles. I regret that we were not in a position earlier to submit such a statement. But I am authorized by the chairman of our group and the representative of India, to

inform the committee that we are now in a position to submit for the committee's consideration a statement on this matter.

Agreement on a statement of this kind has, of course, been no easy task. Anything we proposed had, naturally, to be in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with the resolutions previously accepted by our General Assembly on Korea. Also, our statement had to be realistic enough to have a good chance of being accepted by those concerned without the betrayal of any principles or disloyalty to any obligations which had been previously accepted. Our statement also had to recognize the relationship between a cease-fire and a political settlement, and the importance of proceeding from one stage to another with a minimum of delay but with an understanding of the fact that one stage depended on another, and that each should be implemented under the supervision of appropriate international machinery.

Above all, as we saw it, any statement of principle for a settlement of this kind must be such as to remove fears, suspicions and distrust which poison peace and make security impossible. It was in that spirit that the group of three approached this task. The result is before the committee in the form of a supplementary report made by the three members of our group. This statement deals in a broad way with principles only and with a programme based on those principles. There are, of course, many details to be filled in later if these principles and this programme are accepted by the committee and by the government of Peiping. During this process of filling in the details many of the questions which our statement will undoubtedly raise in the minds of members of the committee will be answered. I assume, however, that now we shall be discussing the principles contained in the statement only—not details or procedures.

If the committee approves the broad programme and these principles, I assume that this approval will be expressed in some appropriate and formal way by the committee and the statement transmitted to the government of Peiping for consideration and, I hope, approval there also. Such approval is, of course, essential before the programme and the principles can be made effective. The statement itself is short and, possibly, I might read it to the committee. It is headed, "Supplementary Report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea", and reads as follows:

"The objective shall be the achievement, by stages, of the programme outlined below for a cease-fire in Korea, for the establishment of a free and United Korea, and for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems.

1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property, and while other steps are being taken to restore peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.

2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.



3. To permit the carrying out of the General Assembly resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent, democratic, sovereign state with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future government.

4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.

5. As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of representation of China in the United Nations."

That is our report. In making it, we share the feeling of many others that there is a very real danger of the armed conflict in Korea spreading over the whole of the Far East if it is not quickly brought to an end. If this widening of the conflict takes place, World War III may soon be upon us, with all its horror and grief and infinite destruction. To prevent this, I am sure we all feel that a supreme effort must be made, an effort which may require reconsideration by all concerned of positions previously taken. This effort must involve, first, the stopping of the fighting in Korea and, then, the establishment of a united and democratic Korea and a peaceful settlement of other Far Eastern problems.

It may well be that nothing less than a conference with the governments principally concerned, under the auspices of the United Nations, can now be effective for achieving an agreed solution of Far Eastern problems, a solution based on justice and within the principles of our Charter, an agreement for the prevention of a general war in the Far East, the consequences of which would not—and indeed possibly could not—be confined to that part of the world.

## **22. Excerpts from Communiqué of January 12, 1951, on the Discussions between the Commonwealth Prime Ministers**

We believe that there are certain courses which must be pursued if real peace is to come.

First, the wounds of the last war must be healed; settlements with Germany and Japan should be made with speed.

Second, we must do what we can to understand those who appear to differ from us. The great antidote to war is hope: its greatest promoter is despair. When we say that war is not inevitable, we do not just mean that we shall

prepare and be strong, and that our strength may deter aggression. We also mean that, in a world worn out and distorted by war, there must be an overwhelming majority of the people of all lands who want peace. We must not despair of reaching them. In all our discussions we have made it clear to each other, as we now do to the world, that as Commonwealth Prime Ministers we would welcome any feasible arrangement for a frank exchange of views with Stalin or Mao Tze-tung. We should, in the name of common humanity, make a supreme effort to see clearly into each other's hearts and minds.

We do not seek to interfere in the affairs of the Soviet Union or China or any other country; we are simply determined to retain the mastery of our own affairs, without fear of aggression.

It is with these considerations in mind that in the last few days we have directed our efforts to the securing of a cessation of hostilities in Korea, so that around the conference table the great powers concerned may compose their differences on a basis which will strengthen the United Nations and fulfil the purposes of the charter.

We all have deep within us a faith in the existence of a purpose of justice in the world, and we believe it to be our duty to forward it by everything we do. Indeed, this sustaining faith derives added strength from the fact that at our meetings it has been simply and sincerely expressed by men of widely different races, traditions and creeds.

**23. Cablegram of January 17, 1951, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly**

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the cablegram dated 13 January 1951, transmitted by Mr. Owen at the request of the First Committee of the General Assembly, on the principles concerning the Korean and other Far Eastern problems. In the name of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China I wish to reply as follows:

1. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has always maintained and still maintains that a rapid termination of the hostilities in Korea should be sought by negotiations among the various countries concerned with a view to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean domestic affairs by the Koreans themselves; that United States armed forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan (Formosa); and that the representatives of the People's Republic of China must assume their rightful place in the United Nations. These principles were also mentioned in my statement of 22 December 1950, transmitted by cable to Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly, on the same day, and are now well known to the whole world.

2. On 13 January 1951, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted without the participation of the representative of the People's

Republic of China various principles concerning the Korean and other Far Eastern problems, the basic points of which are still the arrangement of a cease-fire in Korea first and the conducting of negotiations among the various countries concerned afterwards. The purpose of arranging a cease-fire first is merely to give the United States troops a breathing space. Therefore, regardless of what the agenda and subject-matter of the negotiations may be, if a cease-fire comes into effect without first conducting negotiations to fix the conditions therefor, negotiations after the cease-fire may entail endless discussions without solving any problems. Besides this fundamental point, the other principles are also not clearly defined. It is not clearly stated whether the so-called existing international obligations refer to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and this may easily be utilized to defend the position of aggression maintained by the United States in Korea, Taiwan and other parts of the Far East. We understand that many countries in the First Committee agreed to the principles adopted on 13 January 1951 because of their desire for peace. It must be pointed out, however, that the principles of a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards would only help the United States to maintain and extend its aggression, and could never lead to genuine peace. Therefore the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot agree to this principle.

3. With a view to a genuine and peaceful solution of the Korean problem and other important Asian problems, I hereby submit, in the name of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, the following proposals to the United Nations:

A. Negotiations should be held among the countries concerned on the basis of agreement to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean domestic affairs by the Korean people themselves, in order to put an end to the hostilities in Korea at an early date.

B. The subject-matter of the negotiations must include the withdrawal of United States armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and Far Eastern related problems.

C. The countries to participate in the negotiations should be the following seven countries: The People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, India and Egypt. The rightful place of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be established as from the beginning of the seven-nation conference;

D. The seven-nation conference should be held in China, at a place to be selected.

4. If the above-mentioned proposals are agreed to by the countries concerned and by the United Nations, we believe that it will be conducive to the prompt termination of the hostilities in Korea and to the peaceful settlement of Asian problems to hold negotiations as soon as possible.

CHOU EN-LAI, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central  
People's Government of the People's Republic of China,

PEKING, 17 January 1951.



## **24. Draft United States Resolution on Korea introduced before the First Committee on January 20, 1951**

### *General Assembly*

*Noting* that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;

*Noting* that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has rejected all United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there;

FINDS that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

CALLS UPON the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

AFFIRMS the determination of the United Nations to continue action in Korea to meet the aggression;

CALLS UPON all states and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;

CALLS UPON all states and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

REQUESTS a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly;

AFFIRMS that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and REQUESTS the president of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

**25. Communication of January 22, 1951, from the Chinese People's Government to the Indian Ambassador, Peking**

(1) If the principle that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea has been accepted and is being put into practice, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China will assume the responsibility to advise the Chinese volunteers to return to China.

(2) Regarding the conclusion of the war in Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, we think that we can proceed in two steps. First step: A cease-fire for a limited time-period can be agreed upon in the first meeting of the seven-nation conference and put into effect so that the negotiations may proceed further. Second step: In order that the war in Korea may be concluded completely and peace in East Asia may be ensured, all the conditions for the conclusion of the war must be discussed in connection with the political problems in order to reach agreement upon the following: The steps and measures for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea; the proposals to the Korean people on the steps and measures to effect the settlement of the internal affairs of Korea by the Korean people themselves; the withdrawal of the United States armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits in accordance with Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration; and other problems concerning the Far East.

(3) The definite affirmation of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations must be ensured.

**26. Draft Twelve Power Resolution introduced before the First-Committee on January 24, 1951: "Peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems".**

*Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Yemen*

*The General Assembly,*

*Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,*

*Considering that the continuance of this situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of world peace and security,*

*Noting the reply of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to the resolution of the First Committee dated 13 January 1951,*

*Desiring to continue its efforts to secure a cessation of hostilities in Korea and a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations,*

*Recommends* that representatives of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Egypt and India and of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China meet as soon as possible for the purpose of securing all necessary elucidations and amplifications of the above-mentioned reply and of making any incidental or consequential arrangements towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems.

The first meeting of the above representatives will be held on a date and at a place to be fixed by the President of the General Assembly; the date and place of each subsequent meeting will be fixed by the representatives themselves. They will hold their meetings in private and will frame their own rules of procedure. They will advise the General Assembly of the result of their consultations as early as possible.

**27. List of offers of assistance for Korea, exclusive of United States, up to January 2, 1951 (Circulated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations)**

Country	Date of Offer	Details of Offer	Status
1. Argentina.....	5 Oct.	Canned and Frozen Meat for Troops; offered directly to Unified Command.....	Pending.
2. Australia.....	30 June 28-29 July 3 Aug. 6 Oct. 28 Nov. 28 Nov. 14 Dec.	1 RAAF Squadron..... 3 Naval Vessels..... Ground Forces..... Foodstuffs..... Penicillin crystalline..... 116,000 lbs. Laundry Soap..... Distilled Water.....	In Action. In Action. In Action. Under negotiation. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted.
3. Belgium.....	22 July 28 Sept. 13 Sept. 7 Nov.	Air Transport..... Infantry Battalion..... 400 tons Sugar.....	In Action. En Route. Accepted.
4. Bolivia.....	15 July	30 Officers.....	Acceptance deferred.
5. Brazil.....	22 Sept.	CR. 50,000,000.....	Pending.
6. Canada.....	12 July 21 July 11 Aug. 26 Sept.	3 Naval Vessels..... 1 RCAF Transport Squadron..... Canadian Pacific Airlines (Commercial Facilities)..... Ground Forces.....	In Action. In Action. In Action. Arrived Korea.
7. Chile.....	30 June	Strategic materials.....	No specific offer received.
8. China..	3 July 4 Oct.	3 Infantry Divisions and 20 C-47's.. 10,000 tons Coal..... 1,000 tons Rice..... 3,000 tons Salt..... 20 tons D.D.T.....	Acceptance deferred. Shipped direct to Korea by the Government of China.



Country	Date of Offer	Details of Offer	Status
9. Colombia.....	27 July	General Economic Assistance.....	No specific order received.
	16 Oct.	1 Frigate; offered directly to Unified Command.....	En route.
	16 Nov.	Battalion of Infantry Troops.....	Negotiated directly with Unified Command and accepted.
10. Costa Rica.....	27 July	Sea and Air Bases.....	Accepted.
		Volunteers.....	Acceptance deferred.
11. Cuba.....	2 Oct.	2,000 tons Sugar.....	Accepted.
		10,000 gallons Alcohol.....	Pending.
		Human Plasma.....	Pending.
12. Denmark.....	5 July	Medical Supplies.....	Accepted.
	18 Aug.	Hospital Ship "Jutlandia".....	Accepted.
	28 Aug.	Motor Ship "Bella Dan".....	Withdrawn.
	26 Sept.	500 tons Sugar.....	Accepted.
13. Ecuador.....	1 Aug.	Medicinal Substances.....	No specific offer received.
	13 Oct.	10,000 quintals (500 tons) Rice....	Accepted.
14. El Salvador.....	15 Aug.	Volunteers, if U.S. will train and equip.....	Acceptance deferred.
	15 Aug.	Economic assistance.....	No specific offer received.
15. Ethiopia.....	5 Aug.	\$100,000 (Ethiopian).....	Deposited.
	2 Nov.	Infantry contingent.....	Accepted.
16. France.....	19 July	1 Patrol Gun Boat.....	Withdrawn.
	20 Aug.	Infantry Battalion.....	In Action.
	9 Oct.	Medical Supplies.....	Accepted.
	29 Dec.	Additional Medical Supplies.....	Transmitted to Unified Command.
17. Greece.....	20 July	6 Dakota Transport Aircraft.....	In Action.
	1 Sept.	Ground Forces.....	In Action.
	20 Oct.	100 tons Soap.....	Accepted.
	30 Nov.	25,000 notebooks and pencils.....	Pending.
	27 Dec.	Medical Supplies.....	Transmitted to Unified Command.
18. Iceland.....	14 Sept.	Cod Liver Oil, 125 tons.....	Accepted.
19. India.....	29 July	Field Ambulance Unit.....	In Action.
	4 Oct.	400,000 jute bags (for transport Thailand rice).....	Accepted.
	11 Oct.	Medical Supplies.....	Accepted.
20. Israel.....	22 Aug.	Medical Supplies.....	Accepted.
21. Italy.....	27 Sept.	Field Hospital Unit.....	Accepted.
22. Lebanon.....	26 July	\$50,000 (U.S.).....	Accepted, but not deposited.
23. Liberia.....	17 July	22,400 lbs. natural rubber, valued at \$10,000.....	Accepted.
25. Mexico.....	30 Sept.	Beans, chickpeas, etc., valued at 3,000,000 pesos.....	Accepted.

Country	Date of Offer	Details of Offer	Status
25. Netherlands.....	5 July 8 Sept.	1 Destroyer..... 2 or 3 Infantry Companies.....	In Action. In Action.
26. New Zealand.....	1 July 26 July 6 Oct. 20 Nov.	2 Frigates..... Combat Unit..... Dried Peas, 200-500 tons..... 150 tons milk powder..... 200 tons soap.....	In Action. En Route. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted.
27. Nicaragua.....	16 Nov. 16 Dec.	Rice, 1,000 quintals..... Rice, 2,000 quintals..... Alcohol, 5,000 quarts.....	Pending. Pending. Pending.
28. Norway.....	18 July	Merchant Ship Tonnage.....	In Action.
29. Pakistan.....	29 Aug.	5,000 tons Wheat.....	Accepted.
30. Panama.....	3 Aug.	Contingent volunteers..... Bases for training..... Use of Merchant Marine..... Free Use of Highways.....	Acceptance deferred. Acceptance deferred. Accepted. Accepted.
31. Paraguay.....	3 Nov.	Medical Supplies, valued at \$10,000	Pending.
32. Peru.....	21 Nov.	1 million Soles (\$65,000).....	Offered but not deposited.
33. Philippines.....	7 July 3 Aug. 10 Aug. 7 Sept. 8 Sept. 29 Nov.	50,000 cakes soap..... 17 Sherman tanks..... 1 Tank Destroyer..... Regimental Combat Team..... Vaccines..... 500 Units Fresh Blood..... 20,000 tons Rice..... 500 units Fresh Blood.....	Accepted. In Korea. In Korea. In Action. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Pending.
34. Sweden.....	20 July	Field Hospital Unit.....	In Action.
35. Thailand.....	23 July 20 Sept. 3 Oct.	1 Infantry Combat Team..... 40,000 tons Rice..... 2 Corvettes and Navy Transport... 20 Red Cross personnel.....	In Action. Accepted. In Action. Accepted.
36. Turkey.....	25 July 29 Aug.	1 Infantry-Combat Force..... Vaccines and Serums.....	In Action. Declined, owing to difficulties of transportation.
37. Union of South Africa.....	4 Aug.	1 Fighter Squadron.....	In Action.
38. United Kingdom...	26 July 28 July 19 Oct. 20 Oct. 22 Dec.	Ground Forces..... Naval Forces..... 6,000 tons Salt..... Sulfa Drugs..... 50 tons Yeast.....	In Action. In Action. Accepted. Accepted. Pending.
39. Uruguay.....	14 Sept. 26 Oct.	\$2,000,000..... 70,000 blankets.....	Accepted, but not deposited. Accepted.
40. Venezuela.....	14 Sept.	Medical supplies, blankets, soap, food, value \$100,000.....	Accepted.
















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